Ihab Salloum[ad_1]
The ‘Livelihoods after Land Reform in Southern Africa’ programme has been diligently pursuing this very task. Spearheaded by the University of the Western Cape’s Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, and involving researchers in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (www.lalr.org.za), the focus of their work in Zimbabwe has centered around the province of Masvingo in the southeastern region of the country.
Through a comprehensive study, they have meticulously traced the trajectory of land reform in the province since 2000, meticulously assessing the implications for people’s livelihoods and the broader economy. The findings have shed light on crucial insights that challenge the prevailing ‘conventional wisdom’ prevalent in both media and academic discourse. The research conducted to date has presented fundamental challenges to five frequently echoed myths about recent land reform efforts in Zimbabwe, while delivering vital insights for shaping future rural policies in the country.
Myth 1: Zimbabwean land reform has been an absolute failure.
The reality of land reform in Zimbabwe cannot be summarized with a single narrative; the story itself is complex and multifaceted, varying by region, type of scheme, and settler involved. In Masvingo province, approximately 1.2 million hectares of land have been redistributed among roughly 20,000 households. Yet, within this redistribution, significant variations exist. On the so-called A1 schemes, characterized by small-scale farming with limited capital investment and reliance on local labor, settlers have experienced considerable success, particularly in the province’s more fertile areas.
In these newly resettled areas, a rapid socio-economic stratification has occurred. Some settlers have thrived, while others have faced significant challenges. Instances of departure are not uncommon, often stemming from misfortune, illness, or even death, frequently related to the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS. However, overall attrition rates have remained minimal. On the A2 schemes, intended for small-scale commercial agriculture, the economic crisis of recent years has hindered substantial capital investment, resulting in slow progress for new enterprises.
Nevertheless, there are noteworthy exceptions, where new commercial farming ventures have defied all odds, even amidst hyperinflation and limited access to credit. Regarding the redistributed sugar estates in the lowveld, the story remains similarly varied, as some new farmers have managed to succeed in sugar production on 30-hectare plots, often diversifying with vegetables and other crops to mitigate risk.
Nonetheless, economic conditions have placed immense pressure on these new operations. Furthermore, the estate system, originally designed for large-scale production, has been slow to adapt to the new circumstances. In interviews with new settlers, despite the challenges, enthusiastic support for the resettlement program has been unanimous. As one participant expressed, “Life has remarkably changed for me because I now possess more land and can yield greater agricultural output than before.” Another settler added, “We are happier here in the resettlement areas. There is more land, larger plots, and no overcrowding. In 2006, we achieved excellent yields; I filled two granaries with sorghum.”
Therefore, it becomes abundantly clear that the divisions between A1 and A2, small and large scale, smallholder and commercial farming, are arbitrary and misleading. The integration between these different models is much more fluid and dynamic. Since 2000, the old dualistic agricultural economy inherited from the colonial era has vanished entirely, paving the way for a new agrarian structure to emerge rapidly. Alongside these changes arise challenges, opportunities, winners, and losers. However, characterizing the land reform efforts as a complete failure is an oversimplification. Moving forward, new policy frameworks must acknowledge and accommodate this newfound reality without attempting to re-establish antiquated and obsolete models. As a senior extension official wisely observed, “We do not know our new clients; this is an entirely novel scenario.”
Myth 2: The beneficiaries of Zimbabwean land reform have primarily been political ‘cronies.’
Although it is undeniable that political patronage has influenced land allocation since 2000, particularly in the high-value farms near Harare, the overall pattern extends beyond elite capture. Across the 16 sites and 400 households surveyed in Masvingo, 60 percent of new settlers were categorized as ‘ordinary farmers.’ These individuals originated from nearby communal areas and actively participated in the land invasions, ultimately securing land through the Fast Track Land Reform Program.
These settlers do not belong to a wealthy, politically connected elite but instead represent impoverished, rural individuals who sought land ownership and eagerly aspired to reap the fruits of independence. As one settler aptly articulated, “Land is what we fought for. Our relatives died for this land… Now we must make use of it.” In terms of their socio-economic profiles, this group resembled closely those from the communal areas, albeit slightly younger and marginally better educated, yet burdened with dire lack of assets.
Another group that also greatly benefited from land reform included former farm workers, some of whom actively orchestrated invasions on the farms they had previously toiled on. This segment constituted 7 percent of the total beneficiaries; a figure comparable to the number of war veterans who frequently took the lead in the land invasions, often resulting in their allocation of slightly larger, self-contained plots. Additionally, among the new resettlements, notably within the A2 schemes, there emerged a significant number of civil servants (constituting 14 percent across all resettlement sites), particularly teachers or extension workers who had been granted land. With salaries virtually non-existent in their government positions, access to land became essential for sustaining their livelihoods.
A further 5 percent of beneficiaries were described as businesspeople, often individuals who owned shops, bottle stores, or transportation services in urban areas. Lastly, a group, mostly granted land within the A2 schemes, consisted of security service personnel — police, army, and intelligence officers — who held strong political connections. This group constituted 3 percent of all beneficiaries and was most closely associated with political patronage and affiliations with the ruling party.
It is crucial to emphasize that the aforementioned groups — civil servants, businesspeople, and security service employees — have all contributed, in varying capacities, expertise, and connections that have immensely supported the wider community. The extensive social mix within the new resettlements stands in stark contrast to previous resettlement schemes and the communal areas, offering a fertile ground for social and economic innovation in the future. Understanding this social composition and its inherent potentials will prove indispensable in formulating future policy support for the new resettlements.
Therefore, it is imperative not to make blanket assumptions that equate A1 schemes with the communal areas and view A2 schemes as mere small commercial farms. The new agrarian structure has given rise to a fresh social and economic order within the rural areas of Zimbabwe. Recognizing and nurturing the undeniable yet untapped potentials of this emerging order will require carefully tailored policy support.
Myth 3: There is no investment in the new resettlements.
International media outlets have predominantly presented images of destruction and chaos when it comes to Zimbabwe’s land reform. While it is true that substantial damage has been inflicted on the fundamental infrastructure of commercial agricultural operations in some parts of the country, attributable to both new land occupants and former owners, noteworthy investments have also taken place. Majority of these investments are private endeavors, undertaken by individuals, with negligible state involvement.
The shift from large-scale commercial farming to largely smallholder mixed farming systems has redefined investment requirements. Consequently, investments are no longer in the form of massive pivot irrigation schemes or mechanized dairies, but instead align more closely with immediate needs and ambitions, adopting a modest yet appropriate approach.
New settlers, particularly within the smallholder A1 schemes, have cleared significant swaths of land, averaging around three hectares per household, entailing significant labor in clearing bushes, removing tree stumps, and plowing. Additionally, settlers have constructed new homes, with 41 percent of them being brick structures, often topped with tin or asbestos roofing. A primary investment has centered around cattle breeding, leading to the rapid growth of herds. A staggering 62 percent of households in the resettlements possess cattle, with an average herd size of five.
Moreover, these settlers have acquired essential equipment: 75 percent own plows, 40 percent own bicycles, 39 percent own ox-drawn carts, and 15 percent own private cars. These levels of asset ownership surpass those observed in comparable samples from neighboring communal areas. Since acquiring land, the majority of new settlers have been actively accumulating assets despite facing numerous hardships.
In comparison, the investment landscape within the A2 schemes appears less promising. Most A2 schemes in Masvingo province resemble A1 areas, with only a fraction of the land being put to use. Nevertheless, a select few, armed with access to alternative sources of capital, particularly foreign exchange, have managed to invest in new equipment and cultivate innovative enterprises. For instance, one settler successfully developed an irrigated wheat farm…
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